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iii "Coordination with authorities at all appropriate levels will be key to achieving both our homeland defense and our civil support objectives. In the intergovernmental community at the federal, state and local levels, DoD continues to develop close and collaborative relationships to ensure that the Department's efforts, when appropriate, support and reinforce civilian contingency plans and resources." 2 In its coordination efforts, how can the Department of Defense, through the United
States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Combatant Commander and his Joint Forces
Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), guard against and mitigate the negative impact of organizational and functional seams, friction points, overlaps and gaps with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in response to the maritime terrorist threat? I will examine this close coordination in the arena of maritime homeland security to identify and discuss organizational and functional similarities and differences, and provide recommendations to help resolve issues identified.
Defining the Mission:
A potential friction point becomes apparent even at the most elementary level of defining the DOD/NORTHCOM's mission because there are two similar sounding concepts that have mutually supporting roles, but different practical applications; Homeland Security (HLS) and Homeland Defense (HLD). The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines Homeland Security as, "…a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur." 3 These strategic objectives set the tone for subordinate echelons of government and are incorporated into the very fabric of their individual organizational objectives. The National Strategy for Homeland Security also seeks to mobilize the entire Nation in this effort and emphasizes the need for flexibility at all levels of government. DOD defines its role in supporting Homeland Security as, " (1) homeland defense, the military protection of United States territory, domestic population and critical defense infrastructure and assets from external threats and aggression; and (2 Adding to the potential for confusion is the concurrent responsibility ( Figure 2 6 For ease of discussion, I will primarily use NORTHCOM as the organizational example, but it can be inferred that the same issues, concepts and specific points can be applied to PACOM unless there is a specific difference noted.
In summary, the DOD supports Homeland Security through the overlapping mission 
Recommendations:
• As we all become familiar with the "new normalcy" of terrorism alert levels, along with an increase in overall billet strength, will allow the USCG to continue meeting both their domestic and expeditionary requirements. There is value added to both the RCC/JFMCC and the USCG and both benefit from the experience.
Recommendation:
• 
Recommendations:
• As a stopgap measure, this approach is both feasible and sustainable until the concept of total MDA can move from theory to reality.
The Approaches:
The "Approaches" is a conceptual region between the Forward Region and the Homeland and is based on situation specific intelligence, 16 i.e., a known threat is en route to the Homeland. Thought of another way, this is the "transit zone" between the country of origin and the shores of the U.S., but instead of smuggling drugs, terrorists or other aggressive forces are using the ocean or air as a threat conveyance. In this conceptual layer the JFMCC would focus on surveillance, reconnaissance, and interdiction of surface and/or sub-surface threat vessels. The level of interaction and coordination between the DOD, NORTHCOM, DHS, the USCG and other federal agencies would greatly increase in this layer.
In addition to joint awareness of all forces operating in a given area of ocean, 
Recommendations:
• In order to avoid costly duplication of effort, security and LE activities must be fused with those of NORTHCOM through a Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) to be deconflicted.
• Both the USCG Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security and USNORTHCOM Concept of Operations discuss the need for a layered maritime defense with regard to M-HLS/D. However, while both share a similar concept, the schemes used to achieve the layers are different. They have different names, different boundaries, and focus resources in different ways. Aligning these schemes, through similar nomenclature and region designation would help remove confusion and ensure unity of effort.
Conclusion:
In carrying out the responsibility of defending the Homeland, NORTHCOM must cover a wide spectrum of contingencies over a wide area. The complexity of the maritime environment poses a special set of challenges found in no other portion of the AOR. The volume of legitimate vessel traffic transiting through American ports on a daily basis is staggering and makes sorting contacts a difficult, but not insurmountable task. Cooperation with the USCG and other federal agencies to develop a fully realized Maritime Domain
Awareness will assist in developing a manageable sorting system so detection, monitoring and interdiction efforts can be focused on those vessels that truly pose a threat to the United
States.
In order to fully integrate all elements of national power into a cohesive, and the interagency environment has proven it can be effective. This is a good framework on which to build a robust Homeland Security infrastructure.
The layered approach discussed in the Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security builds a defense in depth construct that helps frame the threat. In order to maximize the effectiveness of this construct, it must be meshed with the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security concept of Layered Maritime Security Operations for Defense in Depth to guard against needless overlap of effort and to ensure a common nomenclature is developed to reduce confusion at the operational and tactical levels.
Uncoordinated effort is wasteful of limited resources and is susceptible to exploitation by a determined enemy. In developing organizational and information transparency, we must strive to reach a new level of jointness whereby every piece fits seamlessly into the larger Homeland Security framework and maximizes their contribution to this truly joint, interagency, international effort to combat terrorism and keep the American Homeland secure. We must start at home by building a layered defense that is both flexible and strong. NORTHCOM's role in developing and maintaining this domestic defense structure is one of coordinated operations that fuses all the resources of the various departments and agencies into one cohesive effort. Homeland Defense and Homeland Security are two sides of the same coin and NORTHCOM must function in both arenas in order to realize its full potential.
